Abstract
Aquinas is quite clear about the definition of moral virtue and its eff ects, but he devotes little space to its function: How does it accomplish what it accomplishes? Aquinas's treatment of the acquired moral virtues in our non-rational appetites reveals that they have at least two functions: they make the soul's powers good instruments of reason, and they also calm the appetites so that one can make moral judgments with an unclouded mind. Virtue in the will has a diff erent, "strong directive" function: it directs our will to certain goods prior to reason's forming its judgment. Aquinas must also hold that the virtues of the non-rational appetites exercise strong direction as well, but we cannot see why unless we examine his account of the infused moral virtues.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-20 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly |
| Volume | 81 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Dec 2007 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy
- Religious studies
Cite this
Aquinas on the function of moral virtue. / Hause, Jeffrey.
In: American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 81, No. 1, 12.2007, p. 1-20.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Aquinas on the function of moral virtue
AU - Hause, Jeffrey
PY - 2007/12
Y1 - 2007/12
N2 - Aquinas is quite clear about the definition of moral virtue and its eff ects, but he devotes little space to its function: How does it accomplish what it accomplishes? Aquinas's treatment of the acquired moral virtues in our non-rational appetites reveals that they have at least two functions: they make the soul's powers good instruments of reason, and they also calm the appetites so that one can make moral judgments with an unclouded mind. Virtue in the will has a diff erent, "strong directive" function: it directs our will to certain goods prior to reason's forming its judgment. Aquinas must also hold that the virtues of the non-rational appetites exercise strong direction as well, but we cannot see why unless we examine his account of the infused moral virtues.
AB - Aquinas is quite clear about the definition of moral virtue and its eff ects, but he devotes little space to its function: How does it accomplish what it accomplishes? Aquinas's treatment of the acquired moral virtues in our non-rational appetites reveals that they have at least two functions: they make the soul's powers good instruments of reason, and they also calm the appetites so that one can make moral judgments with an unclouded mind. Virtue in the will has a diff erent, "strong directive" function: it directs our will to certain goods prior to reason's forming its judgment. Aquinas must also hold that the virtues of the non-rational appetites exercise strong direction as well, but we cannot see why unless we examine his account of the infused moral virtues.
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U2 - 10.5840/acpq200781145
DO - 10.5840/acpq200781145
M3 - Article
VL - 81
SP - 1
EP - 20
JO - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly
JF - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly
SN - 1051-3558
IS - 1
ER -