Assessing policy stability in Iraq: A fuzzy approach to modeling preferences

Peter Colum Casey; Mark J. Wierman; Michael B. Gibilisco; John N. Mordeson; Terry D. Clark

doi:10.1007/s11127-010-9751-1

Assessing policy stability in Iraq: A fuzzy approach to modeling preferences

Peter Colum Casey, Mark J. Wierman, Michael B. Gibilisco, John N. Mordeson, Terry D. Clark

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

The first Council of Representatives elected under the new Iraqi Constitution was unable to pass legislation required to achieve the political benchmarks set by the government. We argue that the exercise of a qualified veto by the three-member Presidency Council essentially required near unanimity among the nine parties of the governing coalition. Given the policy positions of these parties, unanimity was not possible. Our analysis makes use of a fuzzy veto players model. The placement of the government parties along a single dimension based on fuzzy preference measures derived from party text data reveals no common area of agreement.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	409-423
Number of pages	15
Journal	Public Choice
Volume	151
Issue number	3-4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9751-1
State	Published - Jun 2012

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Sociology and Political Science
Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1007/s11127-010-9751-1

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Assessing policy stability in Iraq: A fuzzy approach to modeling preferences'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this

@article{25ef7d69341c4234b30ab11ad71a7996,

title = "Assessing policy stability in Iraq: A fuzzy approach to modeling preferences",

abstract = "The first Council of Representatives elected under the new Iraqi Constitution was unable to pass legislation required to achieve the political benchmarks set by the government. We argue that the exercise of a qualified veto by the three-member Presidency Council essentially required near unanimity among the nine parties of the governing coalition. Given the policy positions of these parties, unanimity was not possible. Our analysis makes use of a fuzzy veto players model. The placement of the government parties along a single dimension based on fuzzy preference measures derived from party text data reveals no common area of agreement.",

author = "Casey, {Peter Colum} and Wierman, {Mark J.} and Gibilisco, {Michael B.} and Mordeson, {John N.} and Clark, {Terry D.}",

note = "Funding Information: coalition capable of passing legislation that is both supported by the government and able to override a veto of the Presidency Council.",

year = "2012",

month = jun,

doi = "10.1007/s11127-010-9751-1",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "151",

pages = "409--423",

journal = "Public Choice",

issn = "0048-5829",

publisher = "Springer Netherlands",

number = "3-4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Assessing policy stability in Iraq

T2 - A fuzzy approach to modeling preferences

AU - Casey, Peter Colum

AU - Wierman, Mark J.

AU - Gibilisco, Michael B.

AU - Mordeson, John N.

AU - Clark, Terry D.

N1 - Funding Information: coalition capable of passing legislation that is both supported by the government and able to override a veto of the Presidency Council.

PY - 2012/6

Y1 - 2012/6

N2 - The first Council of Representatives elected under the new Iraqi Constitution was unable to pass legislation required to achieve the political benchmarks set by the government. We argue that the exercise of a qualified veto by the three-member Presidency Council essentially required near unanimity among the nine parties of the governing coalition. Given the policy positions of these parties, unanimity was not possible. Our analysis makes use of a fuzzy veto players model. The placement of the government parties along a single dimension based on fuzzy preference measures derived from party text data reveals no common area of agreement.

AB - The first Council of Representatives elected under the new Iraqi Constitution was unable to pass legislation required to achieve the political benchmarks set by the government. We argue that the exercise of a qualified veto by the three-member Presidency Council essentially required near unanimity among the nine parties of the governing coalition. Given the policy positions of these parties, unanimity was not possible. Our analysis makes use of a fuzzy veto players model. The placement of the government parties along a single dimension based on fuzzy preference measures derived from party text data reveals no common area of agreement.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=82855181596&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=82855181596&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s11127-010-9751-1

DO - 10.1007/s11127-010-9751-1

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:82855181596

VL - 151

SP - 409

EP - 423

JO - Public Choice

JF - Public Choice

SN - 0048-5829

IS - 3-4

ER -

Assessing policy stability in Iraq: A fuzzy approach to modeling preferences

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Access to Document

Other files and links

Cite this