Assessing policy stability in Iraq

A fuzzy approach to modeling preferences

Peter Colum Casey, Mark J. Wierman, Michael B. Gibilisco, John N. Mordeson, Terry D. Clark

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The first Council of Representatives elected under the new Iraqi Constitution was unable to pass legislation required to achieve the political benchmarks set by the government. We argue that the exercise of a qualified veto by the three-member Presidency Council essentially required near unanimity among the nine parties of the governing coalition. Given the policy positions of these parties, unanimity was not possible. Our analysis makes use of a fuzzy veto players model. The placement of the government parties along a single dimension based on fuzzy preference measures derived from party text data reveals no common area of agreement.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)409-423
Number of pages15
JournalPublic Choice
Volume151
Issue number3-4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2012

Fingerprint

Iraq
EU-presidency
coalition
constitution
legislation
Preference modelling
Unanimity
Government
veto player
Placement
Constitution
Fuzzy preference
Benchmark
Presidency
Veto players
Veto
Exercise
Legislation

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Assessing policy stability in Iraq : A fuzzy approach to modeling preferences. / Casey, Peter Colum; Wierman, Mark J.; Gibilisco, Michael B.; Mordeson, John N.; Clark, Terry D.

In: Public Choice, Vol. 151, No. 3-4, 06.2012, p. 409-423.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Casey, PC, Wierman, MJ, Gibilisco, MB, Mordeson, JN & Clark, TD 2012, 'Assessing policy stability in Iraq: A fuzzy approach to modeling preferences', Public Choice, vol. 151, no. 3-4, pp. 409-423. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9751-1
Casey, Peter Colum ; Wierman, Mark J. ; Gibilisco, Michael B. ; Mordeson, John N. ; Clark, Terry D. / Assessing policy stability in Iraq : A fuzzy approach to modeling preferences. In: Public Choice. 2012 ; Vol. 151, No. 3-4. pp. 409-423.
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