Abstract
The first Council of Representatives elected under the new Iraqi Constitution was unable to pass legislation required to achieve the political benchmarks set by the government. We argue that the exercise of a qualified veto by the three-member Presidency Council essentially required near unanimity among the nine parties of the governing coalition. Given the policy positions of these parties, unanimity was not possible. Our analysis makes use of a fuzzy veto players model. The placement of the government parties along a single dimension based on fuzzy preference measures derived from party text data reveals no common area of agreement.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 409-423 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Public Choice |
| Volume | 151 |
| Issue number | 3-4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jun 2012 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics and Econometrics
- Sociology and Political Science
Cite this
Assessing policy stability in Iraq : A fuzzy approach to modeling preferences. / Casey, Peter Colum; Wierman, Mark J.; Gibilisco, Michael B.; Mordeson, John N.; Clark, Terry D.
In: Public Choice, Vol. 151, No. 3-4, 06.2012, p. 409-423.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Assessing policy stability in Iraq
T2 - A fuzzy approach to modeling preferences
AU - Casey, Peter Colum
AU - Wierman, Mark J.
AU - Gibilisco, Michael B.
AU - Mordeson, John N.
AU - Clark, Terry D.
PY - 2012/6
Y1 - 2012/6
N2 - The first Council of Representatives elected under the new Iraqi Constitution was unable to pass legislation required to achieve the political benchmarks set by the government. We argue that the exercise of a qualified veto by the three-member Presidency Council essentially required near unanimity among the nine parties of the governing coalition. Given the policy positions of these parties, unanimity was not possible. Our analysis makes use of a fuzzy veto players model. The placement of the government parties along a single dimension based on fuzzy preference measures derived from party text data reveals no common area of agreement.
AB - The first Council of Representatives elected under the new Iraqi Constitution was unable to pass legislation required to achieve the political benchmarks set by the government. We argue that the exercise of a qualified veto by the three-member Presidency Council essentially required near unanimity among the nine parties of the governing coalition. Given the policy positions of these parties, unanimity was not possible. Our analysis makes use of a fuzzy veto players model. The placement of the government parties along a single dimension based on fuzzy preference measures derived from party text data reveals no common area of agreement.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=82855181596&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=82855181596&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11127-010-9751-1
DO - 10.1007/s11127-010-9751-1
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:82855181596
VL - 151
SP - 409
EP - 423
JO - Public Choice
JF - Public Choice
SN - 0048-5829
IS - 3-4
ER -