Assessing policy stability in Iraq: A fuzzy approach to modeling preferences

Peter Colum Casey, Mark J. Wierman, Michael B. Gibilisco, John N. Mordeson, Terry D. Clark

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Scopus citations


The first Council of Representatives elected under the new Iraqi Constitution was unable to pass legislation required to achieve the political benchmarks set by the government. We argue that the exercise of a qualified veto by the three-member Presidency Council essentially required near unanimity among the nine parties of the governing coalition. Given the policy positions of these parties, unanimity was not possible. Our analysis makes use of a fuzzy veto players model. The placement of the government parties along a single dimension based on fuzzy preference measures derived from party text data reveals no common area of agreement.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)409-423
Number of pages15
JournalPublic Choice
Issue number3-4
StatePublished - Jun 2012


All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Sociology and Political Science

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