Bootleggers, Baptists, and political entrepreneurs key players in the rational game and morality play of regulatory politics

Randy T. Simmons, Ryan M. Yonk, Diana W. Thomas

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Bruce Yandle developed the bootlegger-and-Baptist model out of his experience as a US regulatory economist in 1983. Bootlegger and Baptist are terms he uses to identify a coalition of seemingly opposed groups who need each other in order to gain the acceptance of a policy proposal. In the bootlegger-and-Baptist story, the two groups come together to achieve a common policy goal. The effects of their collective action are well understood and described in what is becoming a large literature. A second feature is that bootleggers can rely on Baptists to monitor and enforce the restrictions that benefit bootleggers. Discovering new opportunity horizons involves determining the best tactics to use given the type of groups the political entrepreneur seeks to coordinate. The entrepreneur must sometimes begin as a preacher without a congregation who identifies a new policy gospel and preaches it until he has a congregation.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)367-381
Number of pages15
JournalIndependent Review
Volume15
Issue number3
StatePublished - Dec 2011
Externally publishedYes

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morality
baptism
entrepreneur
politics
collective action
Group
collective behavior
tactics
economist
coalition
acceptance
policy
experience

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Geography, Planning and Development
  • Earth-Surface Processes

Cite this

Bootleggers, Baptists, and political entrepreneurs key players in the rational game and morality play of regulatory politics. / Simmons, Randy T.; Yonk, Ryan M.; Thomas, Diana W.

In: Independent Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, 12.2011, p. 367-381.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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