Abstract
A growing body of literature has emerged that examines the contributions of mid-level institutions of accountability (e.g., public ministries, federal police, and electoral courts) in curbing corruption. Notably absent here is the Defensor del Pueblo (ombudsman). This study posits that, under the right conditions, these nonsanctioning bodies have several tools at their disposal that can be leveraged against state actors to reduce corruption. The ombudsman’s unique links to the public (or principal) and external actors allow it to function like a “fourth estate,” but the strength of the office to act as an effective deterrent to corruption is endogenous to the system and actors that created this office. This study conducts a two-stage least squares regression analysis for 17 Latin American countries (2000–2011), provides support for these expectations, and suggests that the ombudsman is beginning to deliver on its promise, at least with respect to corruption.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 126-146 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Latin American Policy |
| Volume | 7 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 2016 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Political Science and International Relations
- Sociology and Political Science
Cite this
Improving the democratic brand through institution building : Ombudsmen and corruption in Latin America, 2000–2011. / Moreno, Erika.
In: Latin American Policy, Vol. 7, No. 1, 01.01.2016, p. 126-146.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Improving the democratic brand through institution building
T2 - Ombudsmen and corruption in Latin America, 2000–2011
AU - Moreno, Erika
PY - 2016/1/1
Y1 - 2016/1/1
N2 - A growing body of literature has emerged that examines the contributions of mid-level institutions of accountability (e.g., public ministries, federal police, and electoral courts) in curbing corruption. Notably absent here is the Defensor del Pueblo (ombudsman). This study posits that, under the right conditions, these nonsanctioning bodies have several tools at their disposal that can be leveraged against state actors to reduce corruption. The ombudsman’s unique links to the public (or principal) and external actors allow it to function like a “fourth estate,” but the strength of the office to act as an effective deterrent to corruption is endogenous to the system and actors that created this office. This study conducts a two-stage least squares regression analysis for 17 Latin American countries (2000–2011), provides support for these expectations, and suggests that the ombudsman is beginning to deliver on its promise, at least with respect to corruption.
AB - A growing body of literature has emerged that examines the contributions of mid-level institutions of accountability (e.g., public ministries, federal police, and electoral courts) in curbing corruption. Notably absent here is the Defensor del Pueblo (ombudsman). This study posits that, under the right conditions, these nonsanctioning bodies have several tools at their disposal that can be leveraged against state actors to reduce corruption. The ombudsman’s unique links to the public (or principal) and external actors allow it to function like a “fourth estate,” but the strength of the office to act as an effective deterrent to corruption is endogenous to the system and actors that created this office. This study conducts a two-stage least squares regression analysis for 17 Latin American countries (2000–2011), provides support for these expectations, and suggests that the ombudsman is beginning to deliver on its promise, at least with respect to corruption.
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U2 - 10.1111/lamp.12094/full
DO - 10.1111/lamp.12094/full
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85019756944
VL - 7
SP - 126
EP - 146
JO - Latin American Policy
JF - Latin American Policy
SN - 2041-7365
IS - 1
ER -