'"Keeping tabs" on coalition partners': A theoretically salient case study of lithuanian coalitional governments

Terry D. Clark, Diana Jurgelevičiute

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Portfolio allocation raises the potential for de facto abdication on a broad range of policy issues among coalition partners. Recent scholarship has addressed how parties in governing coalitions 'keep tabs' on each other in order to avoid such abdication. Two mechanisms have been identified: junior ministerial appointments and chairs of parliamentary oversight committees. We argue that the former is the most common method for intra-coalitional oversight in the Lithuanian parliament and that a combination of the two appears to be employed for monitoring the activities of the most important ministries. We conjecture that dependence on junior ministerial oversight is more likely among coalition partners in less institutionalised parliaments.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)631-642
Number of pages12
JournalEurope - Asia Studies
Volume60
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2008

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Geography, Planning and Development
  • History
  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Economics and Econometrics

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