Rational Irrationality and the Political Process of Repeal

The Women's Organization for National Prohibition Reform and the 21st Amendment

Michael D. Thomas, Diana W. Thomas, Nicholas A. Snow

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The theory of rational irrationality suggests that voters are biased and do not face sufficient incentives to choose rationally; instead they vote for various private reasons. As a result, socially and economically destructive policies can receive widespread public support. Furthermore, because there is no private benefit of learning from experience, such policies can persist over time. We argue here that despite this otherwise dismal outlook on public policy, the theory of rational irrationality leaves two avenues for economically sensible reform: First, when the ex post costs of irrationality are higher than expected, rationally irrational voters will reduce their consumption of irrationality and demand more rational policies. Second, rationally irrational voters can be convinced to rationally update their policy preferences through the use of appealing rhetoric and persuasion by experts. We discuss these two avenues for reform using the example of the repeal of the 18th amendment, which, as we will show, relied on both updating as well as persuasive campaigning.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)130-152
Number of pages23
JournalKyklos
Volume66
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2013
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Prohibition
Amendments
Irrationality
Political process
Political Process
Voters
Public policy
Incentives
Costs
Vote
Public support
Persuasion
Private benefits
Rhetoric
Campaigning
Public Policy
Learning from Experience

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Rational Irrationality and the Political Process of Repeal : The Women's Organization for National Prohibition Reform and the 21st Amendment. / Thomas, Michael D.; Thomas, Diana W.; Snow, Nicholas A.

In: Kyklos, Vol. 66, No. 1, 02.2013, p. 130-152.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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