Squeaky wheels and unequal policy: Executive authority and education reform in Latin America

Clayton Thyne, Erika Moreno

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The World Bank has been increasingly involved in reforming Latin America's education systems. However, compliance with World Bank directives varies greatly. Recent scholarship has made significant progress in fashioning an explanation for this variation by focusing on the presence of democracy. This article takes the literature a step further by identifying the mechanism by which democracy matters. Specifically, variations in executive authority are key factors in explaining the adoption of controversial World Bank directives. The authors argue that a government's ability to implement World Bank reforms and overcome popular dissent, if present, is a function of executive authority. They examine executive authority using several measures to test their hypotheses on a 20-year panel of 17 American states from 1980 to 2000. Results indicate that newly democratized governments and strong executives are indeed more successful in passing World Bank reforms.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)921-946
Number of pages26
JournalComparative Political Studies
Volume41
Issue number7
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2008

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World Bank
Latin America
reform
education
democracy
education system
present
ability

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Squeaky wheels and unequal policy : Executive authority and education reform in Latin America. / Thyne, Clayton; Moreno, Erika.

In: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 41, No. 7, 01.07.2008, p. 921-946.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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