Where Capacity and Incentives Meet: Presidential Decree Authority and Property Rights in Latin America

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Scholars have long suggested a relationship between democracy, capitalistic economies, and the protection of property rights. Yet this link has been contested by a variety of scholars. We test whether a relationship between property rights, measured as risk of expropriation of property, and measures of presidential authority, exists. Where institutional design presents presidents with the capacity and incentives to act on predatory desires, we expect an impact on property rights protections. The empirical results from 17 Latin American countries over a 15-year time period suggest that executive authority helps explain changes in the risk of property expropriation in ways that regime type do not.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)315-346
Number of pages32
JournalPolitics and Policy
Volume43
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2015

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statutary order
right of ownership
Latin America
expropriation
incentive
president
regime
democracy
economy

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

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