Abstract
Scholars have long suggested a relationship between democracy, capitalistic economies, and the protection of property rights. Yet this link has been contested by a variety of scholars. We test whether a relationship between property rights, measured as risk of expropriation of property, and measures of presidential authority, exists. Where institutional design presents presidents with the capacity and incentives to act on predatory desires, we expect an impact on property rights protections. The empirical results from 17 Latin American countries over a 15-year time period suggest that executive authority helps explain changes in the risk of property expropriation in ways that regime type do not.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 315-346 |
| Number of pages | 32 |
| Journal | Politics and Policy |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jun 1 2015 |
Fingerprint
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations
Cite this
Where Capacity and Incentives Meet : Presidential Decree Authority and Property Rights in Latin America. / Moreno, Erika; Witmer, Richard C.
In: Politics and Policy, Vol. 43, No. 3, 01.06.2015, p. 315-346.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Where Capacity and Incentives Meet
T2 - Presidential Decree Authority and Property Rights in Latin America
AU - Moreno, Erika
AU - Witmer, Richard C.
PY - 2015/6/1
Y1 - 2015/6/1
N2 - Scholars have long suggested a relationship between democracy, capitalistic economies, and the protection of property rights. Yet this link has been contested by a variety of scholars. We test whether a relationship between property rights, measured as risk of expropriation of property, and measures of presidential authority, exists. Where institutional design presents presidents with the capacity and incentives to act on predatory desires, we expect an impact on property rights protections. The empirical results from 17 Latin American countries over a 15-year time period suggest that executive authority helps explain changes in the risk of property expropriation in ways that regime type do not.
AB - Scholars have long suggested a relationship between democracy, capitalistic economies, and the protection of property rights. Yet this link has been contested by a variety of scholars. We test whether a relationship between property rights, measured as risk of expropriation of property, and measures of presidential authority, exists. Where institutional design presents presidents with the capacity and incentives to act on predatory desires, we expect an impact on property rights protections. The empirical results from 17 Latin American countries over a 15-year time period suggest that executive authority helps explain changes in the risk of property expropriation in ways that regime type do not.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84930387675&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84930387675&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/polp.12118
DO - 10.1111/polp.12118
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84930387675
VL - 43
SP - 315
EP - 346
JO - Politics and Policy
JF - Politics and Policy
SN - 1555-5623
IS - 3
ER -